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Roundtable

Managing Our Environmental
Portfolio

B Y R O BE R T C O S TAN Z A, H E R M AN DALY, C AR L FO L K E , PA U L H AW K E N , C . S . H O L L IN G , AN T H O N Y J. M C M IC H AE L ,
DAV ID P IM E N T E L , A N D DAV ID R AP PO R T

N

o set of issues has tended to separate economists
and ecologists, especially in the mind of the public,
more than those surrounding the linkages between
economic growth, human carrying capacity, and the environment. The general lack of interest am ong the majority
of economists in problems of the environment and a parallel lack of interest among the majority of ecologists in
economic issues, combined with a lack of dialogue
between the two groups, has allowed extreme positions to
take hold in the public debate and to influence policy to an
inordinate degree.
Just one example from a book that consists of a debate
between Julian Simon and Norman Myers (Myers and
Simon 1994) should suffice to demonstrate just how
extreme some of these positions are. Consider the following quote by Simon:
We now have in our hands— in our libraries, really— the technology to feed, clothe, and supply energy to an ever-growing population for the next 7 billion years. Most amazing is that most of this
specific body of knowledge developed within the past hundred
years or so, though it rests on knowledge that had accumulated for
millennia, of course.
Indeed, the last necessary additions to this body of knowledge—nuclear fission and space travel—occurred decades ago.
Even if no new knowledge were ever invented after those advances,
we would be able to go on increasing forever, improving our standard of living and our control over our environment. The discovery of genetic manipulation certainly enhances our powers greatly, but even w ithout it we could have continued our progress
forever. (Myers and Simon 1994, p. 65)

This degree of faith in the ability of technology to solve
all of humanity’s problems and allow economic and population growth to continue unabated forever is certainly
not shared by many economists (Arrow et al. 1995,
Ravaioli and Ekins 1995). And yet, positions like these
have been taken as the general view of economists on
growth and the environment. For example, a recent lead
article about the environment in The Economist (Anonymous 1997) stated that “Forecasters of scarcity and doom
are not only invariably wrong, they think that being wrong
proves them right.” The article went on to select data out
of context and “spin” the facts to make its case that environmentalists who forecast “doom and gloom” about
environmental trends were invariably wrong and that economic optimists who forecast a rosy environmental future
were invariably right.

A parallel situation holds for ecologists. Environmentalists (who are not necessarily ecologists) have often been
equally guilty of stretching and spinning the facts to try to
win the debate on the environment. They make extreme
statements that are intended to dramatize the situation,
but end up polarizing it instead. For example, environmentalists sometimes argue that any human presence on
the planet is detrimental and that the earth would be better off without any humans at all.
The problem is that these issues are often presented, in
both the scientific literature and the popular press, in a
format that assumes that there is a right and a wrong
answer and that attempts to lay out the opposing positions
so that the audience members can choose for themselves
who is right. This format may appeal to journalis ts trying
to achieve “balanced ” coverage, but the complex and
important issues that are often the subjects of these
debates (e.g., climate change, population growth, biodiversity loss, sustainability) ironically become muddied
rather than sharpened when subjected to this format.
They are not simple black and white issues, and accentuating the debate format makes it difficult to paint a richer,
multicolore d picture and achieve consensus on appropriate courses of action (Tannen 1998). In addition, the jourRobert Costanza (e-mail: costza@cbl.umces.edu) is a professor in
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nalistic search for “balance” often pits a broad scientific
consensus against a few extremists willing to take the
opposite position— hardly an accurate picture of the true
balance of opinion in the community. This is not to say
that a thorough and ongoing discussion is not necessary;
rather, the format should be one of truly balanced and
interactive dialogue rather than confrontational debate in
the journalistic style.
In this article, we attempt to move beyond the “environment as a debate” by focusing on common ground—
the environment as a productive asset shared by all of
humanity. The common challenge is to manage this asset so
as to maximize the probability that it will continue to support human well-being into the indefinite future. This management must be achieved in the face of huge and unresolvable uncertainties about some key assumptions having
to do with the limits of technological change and the
capacity of ecological life-support systems. Consequently,
it is essential to combine data, ideas, and insights from ecology, environmental science, economics, business, psychology, law, engineering, and many other areas. All of these perspectives can provide at best partial truths—they are,
therefore, all needed for effective management of our complex environmental portfolio in the face of uncertainty.

Debating with different visions
One reason that the environmental debate has been so
rancorou s, confrontational, and unproductive is that the
participants are arguing within the context of very different worldviews, or visions, both of how the world is and of
how they would like it to be. These worldviews can be
described in many ways (Bossel 1998), but a fundamental
distinction has to do with their views of technological
progress (Costanza 1989, 1999).
The technological optimist worldview is one of continued expansion of hum ans and their dominion over
nature. Through technological change, humans become
independent of nature. The optimist worldview assumes,
moreover, that technical progress can deal with any future
challenge, that the future will be a smooth extrapolation of
the past, and that the market is a good guiding principle.
This is the “default” vision in current Western society, one
that represents continuation of current trends into the
indefinite future. The quote by Simon at the beginning of
this article represents the extreme form of this vision.
The technological skeptic vision recognizes the importance of technological change but depends much less on it
and more on social and community development. This
worldview assumes that technical progress is ultimately
constrained by the dynamic ecological carrying capacity of
Earth; that the future (like the past) will be full of unpredictable, discontinuous surprises; that humans have to
work in partnership with nature; and that the market is a
good servant but a poor master.
Ask two people holding these different visions to debate
a complex issue, such as global climate change, and the
150 BioScience  February 2000 / Vol. 50 No. 2

result will most likely be them angrily talking past each
other, with both wondering why the other cannot see their
point. The reason is that it is not possible to know whether
the assumptions underlying either of these visions are correct until after the fact. In this article, we contend that the
way to resolve the fundamental disagreement between the
technological optimist and the technological skeptic is
therefore to devise policies that maximize the chances of
success regardless of which worldview turns out to be
right. We show that given this fundamental uncertainty, it
is better to pursue (at least provisionally) those policies
associated with the skeptical worldview rather than those
associated with the optimist worldview, because the benefits of being right are comparable in both cases, but the
costs of being wrong when pursuing the optimist’s policies
are far greater and less reversible than the costs of being
wrong when pursuing the skeptic’s policies.

From an “empty” to a “full” world: A
changing burden of proof
Why is managing humanity’s environmental portfolio so
important? What has changed in the world? From the
optim ist’s point of view, nothing fundamental has
changed— humans should go on dealing with the environment as they always have. From the skeptic’s point of view,
however, a fundamental change has occurred. The world
has changed from one that was relatively empty of humans
and their artifacts to one that is relatively full (Daly 1992).
For more than 99% of humanity’s history, our ancestors
could affect only the local environment. Hunters and gatherers affected their local ecosystems, much as has any other large omnivore, but often more dramatically. For example, hunting cultures are suspected of driving several large
herbivores to extinction and significantly altering the fire
regimes of some ecosystems (Flannery 1994, Diamond
1997), sometimes causing a major local climatic change
(Fagan 1999). Agriculturists altered local to regional vegetation patterns, hydrology, and soils even more dramatically. It has even been suggested (Tainter 1988, Yoffee and
Cowgill 1988, Ponting 1991, Diamond 1997) that most
historical agricultural civilizations (e.g., Egyptian,
Mesopotamian, Roman, Olmec, Chacoan, Mayan) had
collapsed due to inattention to the degradation of their
local environmental resource bases. Industrial cultures can
now affect local, regional, and global biophysical systems
and environmental processes, including climate and ocean
currents (Pimentel et al. 1997b, Vitousek et al. 1997). From
the skeptic’s point of view, the question is, can our current
global civilization break from the historical trend and
achieve sustainability?
During the expansion of industrial civilization in the
last 200 years, humans have faced what appeared to be a
limitless frontier. The optimists believe that technical
progress guarantees that the frontier is still there and will
remain limitless. The skeptics believe that this rapid
human expansion has transformed the planet and is
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beginning to challenge its capacity to support humanity.
Evidence for the skeptics’ view includes a plateauin g in per
capita cereal grain production since the mid-1980s, a
plateauing in ocean fisheries yield, a 10–20-fold increase in
refugees (political, economic, and environmental) in the
past two decades, depletion of freshwater supplies in some
regions, and rapid and continuing changes in the profile of
infectious diseases (i.e., 2 million deaths per year from
AIDS; resurgence of cholera, TB, and malaria; antimicrobial resistance; and the emergence of various new infectious agents associated with changing land-use patterns
and intensification of food production; Wilson 1995, De
Cock and Greenwood 1998, McMichael et al. 1999). The
optimists acknowledge these problems but contend that
they are temporary and will (like all problems before
them) yield to technological advance.
This uncertainty about limits has important implications for how humans manage their environmental portfolio. If it is assumed that the environment is limitless and
that nothing that humans can do will seriously harm it (or
at least that any problems can be fixed), then the burden of
proof should be (as it has been, until now) on those who
wish to show that environmental impacts have occurred.
If, on the other hand, it is assumed that the environment
is not limitless and, in fact, that the world is now full, then
the burden of proof should be shifted to those who potentially harm the environment to show that their activities
will not have any adverse effects. This harm includes not
only pollution but also overharvesting, climate change,
other restructuring of the environment, habitat destruction, and the introduction of exotic species. In a full world,
the assumption should be that some negative impact will
probably occur as a result of these stresses, singly or in
combination, unless and until it can be shown otherwise
(Rapport et al. 1985, McMichael 1993, McIntyre and
Mosedale 1997, Paine et al. 1998).

The environment as a productive asset
The optimist believes that the environment is expendable
because technology can ultimately substitute for any lost
environmental services or am enities. The skeptic believes
that the environment is of critical importance because it
represents humanity’s life-support system, a system that
technology could never adequately reproduce. For people
of both worldviews, however, it is clear that, at present, the
services of ecological systems and the natural capital
stocks that produce them are necessary to the functioning
of the earth’s life-support system (Daily 1997). Ecosystem
services contribu te significantly to economic production
and human welfare (Repetto et al. 1989, Kahn 1998, Kahn
and Farmer 1999) and represent a significant portion of
the total economic value of the planet (Costanza et al.
1997, Pimentel et al. 1997a). Because the value of these
services is not fully captured in markets or adequately
quantified in terms comparable with economic services
and manufactured capital, they are often given too little

weight in policy decisions.
In an empty world, humans could get away with ignoring the value of environmental assets and their impacts on
them because these assets would be relatively abundant. In
a full world, however, neglect of the value of ecosystem services might ultimately (if the technological skeptics are correct) compromise the sustainability of human well-being
and survival in the biosphere. In the current situation—
where there is at least some possibility that the world is
now full— the environmental portfolio must be managed
in a different way. It must be managed as a critical portfolio, similar to the way in which any good business manages
its valuable productive assets under uncertainty.

Managing the environmental portfolio
under uncertainty
Most asset portfolios are subject to fairly high degrees of
uncertainty, and business managers have developed strategies to maximize the benefits derived from these assets in
the face of this uncertainty. Humanity’s shared ecological
assets are an extreme case, in which uncertainty is large
and concerns fundamental assumptions (e.g., about the
ability of technology to substitute for environmental services), and the stakes are high. The debate on the environment has polarized and trivialized attempts to deal with
this uncertainty. When people assume that there are right
and wrong answers in the debate—that either the optimists are right or the skeptics are right— they essentially
ignore this fundamental uncertainty.
However, in the face of this fundamental uncertainty, it
is not rational to blindly bank on technology’s ability to
solve all future environmental problems. Neither is it
rational to assume that technology is impotent. The more
rational position in this case of extreme uncertainty and
ultrahigh stakes is one of skeptical precaution, which
assumes that there will be problems but leaves open the
possibility that these problems can be worked out and that
they might not be as big as was first thought. This position
can be taken without knowing whether the optimist’s or
skeptic’s assumptions are correct, so it is, in effect, a worldview-independent strategy. It does not mean stifling new
technology and taking no risks. On the contrary, it means
managing risks appropriately, in line with their potential
costs, benefits, and uncertainties and without compromising the potential health of the earth’s human populations
and ecosystems (Rapport et al. 1998). This strategy also
means encouraging the kind of technology that has the
best chance of promoting development without irreversibly damaging the natural capital base.
But, the technological optimist might counter, doesn’t
this strategy of skeptical precaution essentially assume
that the skeptics are right? The answer is, no, not in an
absolute sense—only in a provisional sense. That is, it
assumes provisionally that the skeptics are right but continues to encourage technical development. This strategy
makes sense because of the asymmetry of the costs and
February 2000 / Vol. 50 No. 2  BioScience 151

Roundtable

Current policies

Figure 1. Payoff matrix for technological optimism versus
technological skepticism. See text for details.

Real state of the world
Technological
optimist policies
Technological
skeptic policies

Optimists
right

Skeptics
right

High

Disaster

Good

Very good

benefits (Costanza 1999).
To clarify the problem, this optimist versus skeptic
choice can be cast in game theoretic format using the payoff matrix shown in Figure 1, in which the alternative policies that can be pursued today (technological optimist or
skeptic) are listed on the left and the real states of the
world are listed on the top. The intersections are labele d
with the results of the combination s of policies and states
of the world. These payoffs are actually complex future
states of the world that can best be described using fairly
detailed narrative scenarios (Costanza 1999). For the purposes of this discussion, however, we describe them with a
simple overall rating. That is, if the optimist policy is pursued and the world really does turn out to conform to the
optimist’s assumptions, then the payoff might be rated
“Excellent.” This potential for a high payoff is tempting,
especially given that it has paid off in the past. Therefore,
it is not surprising that so many people would like to
believe that the world really does conform to the optimist’s
assumptions. However, if the optimist’s policy is pursued
and the world turns out to conform more closely to the
skeptic’s assumptions, then the result would be rated “Disaster” because irreversible damage to ecosystems would
have occurred and technological fixes would no longer be
possible. If the skeptic policy is pursued and the optimists
are right, then the results would be only “Good.” Economic growth would have been slowed somewhat by overly
cautious policies. If the skeptical policy is pursued and the
skeptical worldview turns out to be right, then the results
are “Very good.” In this last case, humans would have
learned to live well within the ecological constraints of the
planet and build a sustainable partnership with nature.
This simplified game has a fairly simple “optimal” strategy. If there is true uncertainty about the state of the world
(i.e., if the relative probabilities that the skeptic and the
optimist are right are unknown) and the game can be
played only once, then humans should choose the policy
that is the maximum of the minimum outcomes (i.e., the
MaxiMin strategy). In other words, each policy is analyze d
in turn, looking for the worst thing (minimum) that could
happen if that policy is pursued, and the policy that is
picked is the one with the largest (maximum) minimum .
In the payoff matrix in Figure 1, the skeptic’s policy should
be pursued because the worst possible result under that
152 BioScience  February 2000 / Vol. 50 No. 2

policy (Good) is a better outcome than the worst outcome
under the optimist policy (Disaster). In fact, in this game
there is only one nonsustainable outcome (Disaster), and
the object of the game is to avoid that outcome, regardless
of the real state of the world, because that state will not be
known until it is too late.
As an analogy, it is as if a smoker has just been told by a
doctor that there is a possibility that if she continues
smoking, she will contract lung cancer. For any particular
individual, one can never know whether this possibility
will actually happen until it does. An optimistic person
might assume that “it will never happen to me” and go on
smoking, heedless of the risks. She might turn out to be
right, but she might not. A more skeptical person would
weigh the risks and determine if the increased risk of contracting lung cancer is worth the benefits of the shortterm pleasure derived from smoking. He might try to cut
down on his smoking, just to be safe. However, it is not
rational in this situation to attack the doctor or the medical establishment for pointing out the risks and advising
that smoking might cause lung cancer. Likewise, the fact
that global environmental catastrophes have not yet
occurred is no reason to attack the environmental science
community for pointing out the possibility that they
might occur. Yet this is exactly the approach taken by The
Economist (Anonymous 1997) and in much recent
rhetoric based on the extreme technological optimist
worldview.
To move beyond the confrontational debate on the
environment, people have to recognize both the uncertainties and what they do know, and to use that information effectively. There is obviously some chance that
humanity is approaching environmental limits. However,
how big that chance is, is not known—and never will be
known, until it is too late. What is certain is that the environment is currently critical to supporting life on this
planet. Therefore, humanity must now manage its activities vis-a-vis the environment to ensure that this life-support capacity will not be compromised.
How can this goal be accomplished? To effectively manage the environmental portfolio, some strategies might be
used that have proven effective in managing business portfolios of assets under uncertainty. The managers of large
mutual funds and other business assets do not rely on the
invisible hand of the market to maximize the value of their
portfolios. They actively manage them in a proactive and
anticipatory way. The strategies they have developed have
become codified in rules of thumb that have worked for a
broad range of complex assets. How would they apply to
the environmental portfolio?

Protect your capital. The first rule of asset management is to protect the stock of assets and live off the interest. In the context of the environment, the natural capital
stock must be protected so that humans can continue to
enjoy the flow of services that derive from that stock.
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Actions that deplete or degrade the stock should be taken
only in dire cases, when there are no alternatives. This protective strategy should be pursued until it can be conclu sively shown that there are viable substitutes.

Hedge your investments. The classic rule of portfolio
management is “don’t put all of your eggs in one basket.”
Because of uncertainty, humanity cannot afford to put all
of our eggs in the optimist’s “technology will solve all environmental problems” basket. Several eggs must be left in
the skeptic’s “preserve natural capital” basket, just to be
safe. That is, ecosystem preservation must be viewed as an
investment and a hedge against the possibility that other
investments (i.e., technological change) may not yield the
expected returns. This strategy recognizes the dependence
of these other investments on the natural capital “infrastructure,” at least in the short to medium term.

Don’t risk more than you can afford to lose. At
least for the foreseeable future, humans cannot afford to
lose or damage the natural capital base and the ecosystem
services that flow from it. Therefore, it should not be put
at risk. As we have already noted, several regional past civilizations collapsed because they fell into this trap.

Buy insurance. In the presence of uncertainty regarding
a valuable asset, one should buy insurance to protect oneself against the worst-case scenario. Buying “environmental insurance” means not harvesting everywhere (i.e., leaving refugia and reserves) and not harvesting even close to
the sustainable limit. Unfortun ately, recent experience in
fisheries management (Ludwig et al. 1993) indicates that,
with respect to the environment, humans tend collectively
to buy too little insurance and take too many risks.

Why hasn’t portfolio management been
implemented?
If these policies are so straightforward and obvious, then
why aren’t they being implemented? If the global environment were owned and managed like a private firm or like
a portfolio of private financial assets, they would no doubt
have been implemented long ago. The problem is that the
global environment is a common-property (and in many
respects an open-access) resource (Hardin 1968, Hanna et
al. 1996), and the scale of the management problem has far
surpassed the scale of the institutions that have been
developed for local environmental management (Costanza et al. 1998, Ostrom et al. 1999). There is a conflict
between the costs, benefits, and other incentives perceived
by private owners of small pieces of the environment, on
the one hand, and the social costs, benefits, and other
incentives for society as a whole, the entire environment,
and future generations, on the other hand. Humans are
caught in a huge social trap (Cross and Guyer 1980,
Costanza 1987) because of this incentive incompatibility,
which, if left uncorrected, might lead to the collapse of

global industrial society. It is as if a large company, instead
of being run as a single unit by its president and board of
directors on behalf of all the shareholders, was instead
divided into smaller, independent subunits, none of which
had to account to any other for the resources it used. Such
a company would not last long. But it is just this kind of
system that is currently in place for managing many of the
planet’s environmental assets.
Given the current value of environmental assets to
humanity (and the uncertainties about the core assumptions concerning their use), humans need to manage these
assets at least as wisely as individual investors manage
their stock portfolios. Whether the portfolio is a set of
financial assets or the set of systems and processes that
make up the biosphere, what really needs to be managed
or controlled is the behavior of the asset manager, in the
light of objective conditions (i.e., the laws of finance or
ecology) and the ultimate goals. But who is the asset manager in the case of the environmental portfolio? The fundamental problem with environmental management is
that no effective institutions exist at the appropriate scale
for managing humanity’s collective behavior and its common global environmental portfolio.
A first step toward developing such institutions is to
recognize both the value of these environmental assets to
society’s continued survival and the unresolvable uncertainty about technology’s ability to substitute for them.
Only then will it be possible to move beyond the “argument culture ,” which inappropriately casts the complex
problem of managing our environmental portfolio as a
simplistic debate, to work together to design new worldview-independent policies and institutions for effective
and sustainable management at the appropriate scales.

Institutions for managing the
environmental portfolio
What will these new institutions look like? First of all, they
will need to be integrated in a framework of sustainable
governance. Costanza et al. (1998) have identified six core
principles for sustainable governance: responsibility (access
to environmental resources carries attendan t responsibilities), scale-matching (institutions should match the scale
of the environmental problem), precaution (in the face of
uncertainty about potentially irreversible environmental
impacts, humans should err on the side of caution), adaptive management (decision-makers should acknowledge
uncertainty and continuo usly gather and integrate information, with the goal of adaptive improvement), full cost
allocation (all of the internal and external costs and benefits of the use of environmental resources should be identified and appropriately allocated ), and participation (all
affected stakeholders should be engaged in the formulation and implementation of decisions concerning environmental resources).
The design of institutions that employ these principles
for the sustainable governance and adaptive management
February 2000 / Vol. 50 No. 2  BioScience 153
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of the environmental portfolio has already begun in prototype at smaller scales (Holling 1978, Walters 1986, Caldwell 1990, Lee 1993, Gunderson et al. 1995, Berkes and
Folke 1998). In adaptive institutions, the implementation
of policy prescriptions acknowledges the uncertainty
embedded in different worldviews and models and
encourages participation by all the affected stakeholder
groups. Adaptive management views policy and management as experiments, in which interventions at several
scales are made to achieve understanding and to identify
and test the effects of policy options. Policies are taken, not
as the ultimate answers, but rather as guides to the experimentation process. More emphasis is placed on monitoring and feedback to check and improve the process, and, as
with all good experiments, caution is used to make sure
the system under study remains intact. Some examples of
evolving institutional designs that meet the criteria for
sustainable governance and adaptive management of environmental assets include share-based and co-managed
fisheries (Wilson 1997, Young 1998), integrated watershed
management (Naiman 1994, Pelley 1997, Heathcote
1998), and marine protected areas (Bohnsack 1993, Jones
1994, Lauck et al. 1998).

Conclusions
The environmental debate is counterproductive because it
is based on untestable core assumptions embedded in
deeply held worldviews. To move forward, it is essential to
acknowledge these different worldviews and to search for
policies and institutions that are worldview independent.
Regardless of worldview, there is general agreement that
environmental assets are important and that their use by
humans needs to be managed. Given the uncertainty and
the size of the stakes, it is most rational to pursue, at least
provisionally, a strategy that presumes a technologically
skeptical worldview as outlined here but does not discourage ecologically and socially positive technical change.
Appropriate technology is an essential ingredient in
achieving sustainability. Much can be learned from the
experience and strategies of the managers of financial
portfolios, which are also subject to high uncertainty. Ultimately, these strategies need to be embedded in new participatory institutions that can provide sustainable governance and adaptive managem ent of our shared
environmental portfolio at the appropriate scales.
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